Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
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OFFICE OF THE CLERK

No.

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1994

RICHARD MANNO,

Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF NEW YORK and JUDITH MANNO,

Respondents.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

RICHARD MANNO
Petitioner, Pro Se
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. Whether a Federal District Court was correct to deny Petitioner a hearing.

A. Whether a "domestic relations exception" precludes Federal Courts from examining state laws for constitutionality as drafted, as applied, and/or both.

B. Whether a "domestic relations exception" precludes Federal Courts from examining state actions for constitutionality regarding due process, equal protection, non-discrimination, and other constitutionally prohibited or mandated criteria.

C. Whether a "domestic relations exception" precludes Federal Courts from handling suits *not* originated federally for "diversity of citizenship" reasons.

D. Whether a "domestic relations exception" precludes Federal Courts from intervening when the relief sought (or likely to be granted) is not a direct divorce, alimony, or child support *decree*, but rather instructions to state courts to fairly afford a appellant his rights, granting him a fair hearing and judgment.

E. Whether a "domestic relations exception" precludes Federal Courts from intervening when matters involved are beyond the very specific areas of "divorce," "alimony," and "child custody."

II. Whether the United States Court of Appeals was correct to affirm the hearing denial.

> Whether federal intervention to the limited extent of requiring states to act constitutionally, and *without* the issuance of direct divorce, alimony, or child support decrees, would necessarily "eviscerate the domestic relations exception" (quotation from page 3 of the United States Court of Appeals Order of November 10, 1994).

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner:

RICHARD MANNO, *Pro Se*
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Respondents:

STATE OF NEW YORK
Represented By:
G. OLIVER KOPPEL
Attorney General of the State of New York
Litigation Bureau, 24th Floor
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APPENDIX

Appendix A — Order of Dismissal by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York Dated April 18, 1994 ..... 1a

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OPINIONS BELOW

The Order entered April 18, 1994 of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Dismissing the Petitioner's Complaint (1a).

The Order Entered November 10, 1994 of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Affirming the Judgment of the District Court (4a).

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was entered on November 10, 1994. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

(i) Date of Entry of Order for which Review is sought:
November 10, 1994
Order #94-7510 from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

(ii) United States Supreme Court review is requested due to:

(a) denial of a hearing (*sua sponte* dismissal of complaint) by a United States District Court regarding:

the constitutionality of New York State's Child Support Standards Act,

the denial of appellant's due process rights under the United States Constitution by applying said Act to appellant in a New York State court action,

the constitutionality of the general implementation of said Act,

the constitutionality of the Act, its general implementation, and its specific application to appellant all combined,

the denial of appellant's due process rights by New York courts by denying him a hearing on the matter of a certain "stipulation" and its surrounding issues.

(b) affirmation of the hearing denial (*sua sponte* dismissal of complaint) of the District Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

STATUTES & CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

The Constitutional provisions involved in this case relate to actions prohibited to the states; the bill of rights and other due process, equal protection, and non-discriminatory sections and amendments; prohibitions against harsh and excessive punishment and where *excessive*; to taking without compensation; and the federal guarantee of a republican form of state government and other guarantees to individual citizens.

The statutes involved in this case are the New York Child Support Standards Act of 1989, the Federal Domestic Relations Enforcement Act, and related laws and practices.

These have not been included verbatim in this Petition for reasons of brevity, economy, and since a direct ruling by this Court is not requested on their compatibility, but rather a remand to an appropriate lower Federal Court is requested where they can be examined at length.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Federal intervention by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, was sought because Petitioner contends, in part, that his Federal Constitutional Rights were violated in a New York action.

This is not an appeal of a domestic relations finding. It goes instead to the constitutionality of the law and procedure. The issues include:

A. The application of an *ex post facto* New York law, namely the Child Support Standards Act effective September 1, 1989 (Respondent Judith Manno having commenced an action in January of 1989, and other significant events having occurred some years prior to 1989);

B. Denial of Petitioner's due process rights under the Fifth and/or Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution due to application of this law in this action;

C. Said law being unconstitutional for other reasons also;

D. The application of said law also being unconstitutional;

E. The combination of the law and its application being unconstitutional;

F. Denial of a hearing on the matter of a certain "stipulation" and its surrounding issues, the right to be heard being perhaps the most fundamental of due process rights.

Petitioner Richard Manno and Respondent Judith Manno were married in New Jersey on July 1, 1967, in a religious ceremony which included a vow referring to the precepts of the religious organization of which they were and are members.

Eight presently living children ensued from their union, current ages being 25 through 9. The eldest four children were born in New Jersey; the next three were born in (the Federal Territory of) the United States Virgin Islands; the youngest child was born April 1, 1985 in Florida.

All ten people were living in New York State from approximately September 1985 for several years. Approximately January, 1989, Judith Manno commenced a divorce action against Richard Manno.

Thereafter, New York State passed its Child Support Standards Act effective September 1, 1989.

Petitioner contends the act and/or its implementation and/or its application to him is unconstitutional for several reasons, to be fully explained in an appropriate Federal Court as, it is most respectfully requested, to be directed by this United States Supreme Court.

Approximately June 6, 1990, an oral stipulation was seemingly entered into between Petitioner and Respondent.

At a state court trial in September, 1990 Petitioner contended that the stipulation should be set aside for four reasons:

A. It might not yet have been in effect.

B. Petitioner contended he did not know or appreciate the nature or consequences of the agreement on a macro level, and to a significant extent on a micro level. He was emotionally distressed and upset at the time of the stipulation with disjointed thinking and no resistance, due to the distress and upset.

Petitioner contended he could show this in three ways:

1. His actions prior to the (June 6, 1990) court day;

2. His actions during that court day;

3. Specific elements of the stipulation, not just because they were bad for him, but because they would demonstrate he was not aware of the nature or consequences of what he was doing.

C. The agreement

1. In its entirety;

2. And specific portions of it;

3. And the way they came about is unconscionable.

D. If the agreement actually was in effect, then it had been materially breached (by Respondent) and Petitioner therefore was entitled to have it cancelled if he so wished.

The trial level New York State Court would not allow Petitioner to enter any evidence on this issue and essentially dismissed it.

Petitioner appealed much of the trial court's decision(s) to the New York State Appellate Division. In mid 1993, the Appellate Division remanded portions of the trial court's decision to the trial court, but denied Petitioner relief regarding the stipulation.

Petitioner requested the New York Appellate Division for reargument and/or permission to appeal to New York State's highest court, which request was denied in October, 1993. By not giving him a fair hearing and/or allowing him to introduce

evidence, Respondent contends his due process rights were violated.

Petitioner then filed a complaint with the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the State of New York and Judith Manno in November, 1993.

On April 18, 1994, the United States District Court dismissed Petitioner's complaint citing "the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction".

In June, 1994, the New York State Trial Court Judge refused himself from further proceedings in this case because he "could not remain objective" towards Petitioner. Although this action took place after the events mentioned in Petitioner's original federal complaint, the loss of objectivity had to have occurred significantly earlier, and I believe will be shown to be part of Petitioner's unfair treatment by the New York State Courts.

Also in June, 1994, appellant appealed the *sua sponte* dismissal of the Federal District Court to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

On November 10, 1994, the United States Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's dismissal, which affirmation is the cause of this Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Petitioner respectfully submits that the United States Court of Appeals has:

(i) Decided an important question of federal law which has not directly been, but should be, settled by the United States Supreme Court;

(ii) And although the ruling of the Appeals Court does not seemingly, *directly* conflict with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;

a. It seems to Petitioner to go *significantly beyond* the most relevant Supreme Court ruling (*Ankenbrandt v. Richards*, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. (1992));

b. It respectfully seems to Petitioner to go *contrary to the overall theme* of the *Ankenbrandt* ruling, which seems to limit the "domestic relations exception" rather than expand it;

c. It respectfully seems to Petitioner to significantly *infringe on the rights of the federal judiciary*;

(iii) And, if allowed to become a precedent, the decision has the potential to allow significant undermining of our constitution, by potentially "creative" state governments in the future.

The central problems are the unconstitutionality of a New York State law and the denial of due process in that the New York State courts will not afford me a full and complete hearing (or seemingly any hearing at all).

The Federal District Court and the Appeals Court seemingly have based their refusal to hear my complaint on the "domestic relations exception." For reasons which I shall advance below, I respectfully contend that the "domestic relations exception" recognized to date by the United States Supreme Court, as well as the cases cited by the District Court Judge, do not apply, and that to apply it to my case would be a significant (and, respectfully, unwise) expansion of said exception.

The five cases cited by the District Court were all brought before Federal Courts due to diversity of citizenship. They therefore should not serve as precedent to exclude cases (such as mine) brought for cause of unconstitutionality of laws and/or actions/inactions. Therefore, when the issue is a constitutional challenge to a law (such as in my case) the subject matter of the law, be it divorce, alimony, or otherwise is and/or should be of no import. My case should therefore be allowed to proceed.

At the outset, I wish to make clear that I will not be asking a Lower Federal Court for "the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree." I will be asking the Lower Court to:

> Find a state law unconstitutional in itself and/or its implementation and/or its specific application to me;
>
> Find that the state courts did not afford me due process and/or violated other of my rights by not giving me a full, fair, and complete hearing;
>
> And direct the state courts to then proceed accordingly and grant me my full rights and hearings under laws and procedures in accord with our Constitution.

Furthermore, with every respect, I submit that the Appeals Court is not correct that to examine state laws and actions for constitutionality in the domestic relations area would "eviscerate the domestic relations exception." Once certain that the states were acting constitutionally, the domestic relations exception would become even stronger, so long as the states continued to so act.

In addition, my understanding is that Attorney General Reno recently announced that she intends to enhance federal enforcement of a federal law which criminalizes non-compliance with certain state court orders/decrees in the domestic relations area.

Also, this intertwining of Federal/Criminal with (nominally) State Civil law does, Petitioner contends, have the effect of moving this entire section of laws from the civil area to the criminal area, and this entitles citizens to the added protections afforded in criminal actions. In addition, Petitioner contends that the relevant state law is actually a criminal law in the guise of a civil law, and that the above intertwining is further proof of same.

And to have Federal Courts enforce state judgments/decrees which may have been the result of unconstitutional laws or processes (or of no law or due process at all) without examination simply because it falls in the domestic relations area is just not going to be a good or proper situation in which to find ourselves.

Indeed (and fortunately this seems remote currently, but then so do many evil things at times), I'm certain your Honors can see far more clearly than I how refusal to examine a segment of our laws for constitutionality could potentially lead to the establishment of at least a partial tyranny by the "creative" tying of deliberately malicious unconstitutional laws and practices to an area of law excluded from constitutional review.

Regarding the *Ankenbrandt* decision cited by the District Court.

A. *Ankenbrandt,* Section III, last paragraph, first sentence:

> By concluding as we do, that the domestic relations exception encompasses *only* cases involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree, we necessarily find that the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the District Court's invocation of the exception. (emphasis added).
>
> I am not asking a District Court to grant or undo a divorce decree.
>
> I am not asking a District Court to grant or undo an alimony decree (in fact, there is no alimony involved in this case).
>
> I am not asking the District Court to grant or undo a child custody decree.
>
> Therefore no domestic relation exceptions should here apply.

B. Further, my layman's reading of *Ankenbrandt* seems to indicate that the domestic relations exception is neither constitutional, nor codified, but simply a matter of precedent subject to common sense override on a case by case basis.

Consequently, to contend that *Ankenbrandt* in any way denies our Federal Courts the authority to examine the constitutionality of *any* state law or action or inaction does not seem to me to be the intent of the ruling. Indeed, to a layman, the

oaths of office taken by our Federal (and New York State) officials and Judges seemingly mandate that such examination be made on application, with no exception.

C. 1. And should a state at some future time, for example, pass a law mandating the infliction of cruel and unusual torture and/or death on one party or another coincident with a decree of divorce, is *Ankenbrandt* to be read so as to prohibit the Federal Courts from finding such law unconstitutional, or even in such an extreme case, dissolving the divorce decree itself if the Court so chose?

First, I contend that *Ankenbrandt* does not read so as to prohibit such Federal Court action, even directly related to the issuance of a (non-) divorce decree.

Second, I contend that the overall tone of *Ankenbrandt,* if not indeed precise wording the full import of which I was unable to fathom, indicates that the Federal Courts *should* intervene in such an instance in one way or other.

And thirdly, even if I did not read *Ankenbrandt* correctly, I contend that it should be read as I believe, or justice could not be served.

2. Further, *Ankenbrandt* notes (Section IV, paragraph 1) that "abstention should *rarely* be invoked because the Federal Courts have a 'virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them' " (emphasis added).

Also, Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion also clearly states "the Court is correct that abstention '*rarely* should be invoked.' " (Section IIA, last paragraph, emphasis added).

D.1. *Ankenbrandt* uses the same very precise and restrictive

language at least seven times (referring specifically *only* to "divorce", "alimony", "child custody") as follows:

Section III, paragraph 4 (twice)

Section III, paragraph 5 (once)

Section III, paragraph 6 (once)

Section IV, paragraph last (twice)

Section V, main paragraph (once)

2. And Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion uses the same very precise and restrictive language (referring *only* to "divorce, alimony, and child custody") as follows:

Introductory paragraph (once),

Section I, paragraph 1 (once),

Section IIA, paragraph 2 (once).

3. There is no alimony in this case. The grounds for granting divorce in New York are not being challenged. The constitutionality of the New York child *support* act, levels, general implementation, and specific application is being challenged, but not the constitutionality of New York child *custody* laws at this time.

4. Therefore even if this were a suit raised due to citizenship diversity and not constitutionality, no domestic relations exemption should apply since the subject matter is not specifically included in the exemption.

The four *non-Ankenbrandt* cases cited by the District Court are earlier than *Ankenbrandt,* and are not United States Supreme Court decisions. Hence, it would seem that *Ankenbrandt* supersedes them, as well as noting in footnote No. 2 the prior diversity in application of any "*diversity* exception" by various Appeals Courts.

Hence, the other cases must all defer to *Ankenbrandt.* And all the cases, along with *Ankenbrandt,* refer only to a domestic relations exception for diversity of citizenship cases; not for constitutional challenge.

Of further note is the dissenting opinion by Judge Gibbons in the *Solomon* case (specifically the fifth paragraph from the end beginning "this brings me to"), as well as other portions of the cited cases, which seem to demonstrate that there is strong precedent for the Supreme Court's precise terminology of "divorce", "alimony", and "child custody" in *Ankenbrandt,* and to the extent the precise terminology, on close inspection, did not fit, to *not* withhold exercise of jurisdiction.

For all of the reasons advanced above, for all arguments which could further be made on my behalf but of which I am either unknowledgeable or too unskilled to make, separately and in their totality, I most respectfully contend that no "domestic relations exception" does or should apply to my case, and that my case should be permitted to proceed.

Regarding Petitioner's Good Faith

A. I have paid the $105.00 docket/filing fee(s) for the appeal to the Appeals Court, and the $300.00 docket/filing fee for Your Honors' Court. I have no or negligible income at this time. I do not part with that amount of money lightly at this point.

If non-payment of moneys might potentially subject me to being considered as not acting in good faith, then I contend that a payment of some nature should have an opposite effect.

B. The issues I raise are not frivolous, nor am I. I am hard pressed to think of an other area of law which has such a major impact on such a large (if not an actual majority) of our nation's citizenry, as the whole domestic relations area.

To then contend that state laws and practices in this area cannot even be examined for constitutionality is no small or frivolous matter, but can (and does, I submit) lead to severely detrimental consequences for large numbers of citizens, including myself.

C. If I read *Coppedge* correctly, "the burden of showing that the right to appeal has been abused is on the party making the suggestion" (Justice Stuart and Brennan's concurring opinion(s), end of paragraph 2). I respectfully submit that no such showing has been made in this case.

D. If I read the decisions of the District and Appeals Courts correctly, it is because Their Honors believe I am wrong regarding whether the Federal Courts are barred from intervening in this case that they contend that this appeal is frivolous or not in good faith. Again, I am not about this for other than serious reasons, and I just don't believe the domestic relations exception applies to this case. What else can or should I do except appeal?

E. I therefore respectfully request that certifications of frivolity or non-good faith be stricken.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing advanced reasons, individually and/or taken together as a whole, Petitioner respectfully requests that the United States Supreme Court:

A. Strike and/or overturn allegations regarding Petitioner acting frivolously or in other than good faith;

B. Directly instruct an appropriate Federal Court to hear Petitioner's Federal complaint in full, or grant certiorari; and

C. Afford such other relief to Petitioner as it feels to be just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

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APPENDIX A — ORDER OF DISMISSAL BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DATED APRIL 18, 1994

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

94 CIV 2798

RICHARD MANNO,

Plaintiff,

-against-

THE STATE OF NEW YORK; JUDITH MANNO,

Defendants.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff, brings this case pro se alleging that his constitutional rights were violated when New York state courts applied the Child Support Standards Act in his divorce action and denied plaintiff "a hearing on the matter of a certain 'stipulation' and its surrounding issues." Complaint, at 1; *see Manno v. Manno*, 600 N.Y.S. 2d 968 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1993). We grant plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis, but dismiss the complaint for the reasons discussed below.

The domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction bars this court from considering plaintiff's claim. The recent Supreme Court decision, *Ankenbrandt v. Richards*, __U.S. __, 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992) reaffirmed the continued validity of the domestic relations exception, stating that the exception divests federal courts of jurisdiction "to issue divorce, alimony and child custody decress." *Id.*, 112 S. Ct. at 2215. Plaintiff's claim falls within the

ambit of cases excluded by *Ankenbrandt* because the gravamen of his claim involves child support — an area at the core of the domestic relations exception. *See Csibi v. Fustos*, 670 F.2d 134, 137 (9th Cir. 1982); *Jagiella v. Jagiella*, 647 F.2d 561, 565 (5th Cir. 1981); *Solomon v. Solomon*, 516 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1975); *Cook v. Winters*, 645 F. Supp. 158, 159 (S.D. Tex. 1986). The issues of child visitation rights, custody and divorce decrees are better left to the state courts which are more experienced in interpreting and applying their own domestic relations laws.

Accordingly, the complaint, filed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3). We certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith. *See Coppedge v. United States*, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED

s/ Thomas P. Griesa
THOMAS P. GRIESA
Chief Judge

Dated: APR 18 1994
New York, New York

APPENDIX B — CIVIL JUDGMENT BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DATED APRIL 18, 1994

94 CIV. 2798

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

RICHARD MANNO,

Plaintiff,

-against-

THE STATE OF NEW YORK; JUDITH MANNO,

Defendants.

CIVIL JUDGMENT

Pursuant to order issued APR 18, 1994 by the Honorable Thomas P. Griesa, Chief Judge, dismissing the complaint it is,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: That the complaint be and it is hereby dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). We certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that any appeal from the Court's order would not be taken in good faith.

s/ Thomas P. Griesa
THOMAS P. GRIESA
Chief Judge

Dated: APR 18 1994
New York, New York

THIS DOCUMENT WAS ENTERED ON THE DOCKET ON____

APPENDIX C — ORDER BY THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT FILED NOVEMBER 10, 1994

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

94-7510

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held at the United States Courthouse in the City of New York, on the tenth day of November, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-four.

Present:

Honorable Thomas J. Meskill,
Honorable Ralph K. Winter,
Honorable J. Daniel Mahoney,
Circuit Judges.

RICHARD MANNO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF NEW YORK and JUDITH MANNO,

Defendants-Appellees.

ORDER

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.

Appendix C

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of record from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and was argued.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment of said District Court be and it hereby is affirmed.

Richard Manno appeals, pro se, from Judge Griesa's *sua sponte* dismissal of his complaint, which alleged a violation of his constitutional rights by the New York state courts when they (i) applied the Child Support Standards Act to his divorce and (ii) denied him a hearing on certain matters. On appeal, Manno claims that the domestic relations exception does not apply to his complaint because he is not asking federal courts to rule on a divorce, alimony, or child support decree. Rather, he argues, he seeks only to require New York state courts to accord him due process.

The district court's *sua sponte* dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) is reviewed under a standard of abuse of discretion. *Denton v. Hernandez*, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1734 (1992). The district court was justified in dismissing Manno's complaint because its substance ws "frivolous on its face." *Robles v. Coughlin*, 725 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam). Manno's claim is frivolous because it is grounded on a legal theory that is "indisputably meritless." *See Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).

Manno's claims relate to a divorce proceeding and the child support issues that have arisen in the penumbra of such proceedings. The domestic relations exception precludes the federal court from issuing "divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees." *Ankenbrandt v. Richards*, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2215 (1992).

Appendix C

Manno asserts that his complaint does not fall within the ambit of the domestic relations exception because he is not asking for a decree, but rather for federal intervention in an unjust state proceeding. Accepting this assertion would, of course, eviscerate the domestic relations exception.

We will impose sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 only if there is a "clear showing of bad faith." *Schiff v. United States*, 919 F.2d 830, 834 (2d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation omitted), *cert. denied*, 501 U.S. 1238 (1991). Considering that Manno appeals *pro se*, and considering that his brief evinces genuine confusion about the different roles of federal and state courts, we do not believe that sanctions are appropriate at this stage.

Nonetheless, Manno is advised that future attempts to make a federal case out of his child support obligations will result in monetary sanctions. Moreover, it will also result in an injunction preventing him from certain further filings.

We therefore affirm.

s/ Thomas J. Meskill
Hon. Thomas J. Meskill, U.S.C.J.

s/ Ralph K. Winter
Hon. Ralph K. Winter, U.S.C.J.

s/ J. Daniel Mahoney
Hon. J. Daniel Mahoney, U.S.C.J.